Kant's Moral Philosophy (Part I)

1 General Remarks on the “Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals” (1785)
1.1 Function within Kant’s philosophy: provides a foundation for a concrete “Metaphysics of Morals” (1797), consisting out of a “Doctrine of Justice” and a “Doctrine of Virtue”
1.2 Aim: this foundation should be not empirical, because the answer to the question “what should I do?” has to be applied to all human beings (and rational beings beyond that, as Kant points out).

2 The “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals” (GMM)
2.1 Organization of the GMM
"First Section: Transition form the Ordinary Rational Knowledge of Morality to the Philosophical
Second Section: Tranition from Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysics of Morals" (p. 5[392])
2.2 Starting point„There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will.” (p. 7 [393])
- All other abilities of man (like intelligence, courage etc.) can be used for negative purposes.
- “Good will” means more than good intention it is already closely related to the concept of duty.
- The good will stands “at a crossroads between its a priori principle, which is formal, and its a posteriori incentives, which is material.” (p. 13 [400])
2.3 Moral acting is acting out of duty
Duty understood as: ought to, should; opposed to the concept of inclination (= what I want to do). Kant defines it as “the objective necessity of an action from obligation.” (p. 44 [439]).
Four cases: 1) against duty; 2) according to duty, without immediate inclination, 3) according to duty, with inclination, 4) out of duty, against inclination. Case 4 is the only case of moral worth. (Although praise and encouragment might be attributed to 2) and 3); same action can have different moral worth;
2.4 Role of happiness and reason
- Happiness is “the natural end that all men have” (p. 37, [430] see also p. 8) The definition Kant puts forward is that happiness is “the sum of satisfaction of all inclinations” (p. 12, [399]) Our natural constitution strives towards happiness, which might be attained by instinct rather then by reason.
- Reason: “is not competent enough to guide the will safely as regards its objects and the satisfaction of all our needs” (p. 9 [396]). But reason is “absolutely essential” (p. 9 [396]) to produce a good will. Indeed: reason “recognizes as its highest practical function the establishment of a good will” (p. 9 [396])